Divisions at the top raise questions about Xi's confidence in the PLA
T
hings were looking so promising for Chairman Xi Jinping, who sat undisputed at the top of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) totem pole. However, momentous events such as a COVID-19 pandemic, his Russian comrade's invasion of Ukraine, and the endemic rot of corruption within the party, are threatening his supremacy.
Indeed, despite unrelenting directives calling for loyalty to the CCP, Xi must be wondering whether he can trust the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to perform its duty - of which an invasion of Taiwan would be the ultimate order. Conversely, the PLA may well be nervous at the direction that despotic Xi has taken China.
On August 1, the PLA's anniversary, Xi ordered personnel to "deeply push forward preparations for military struggle...(and) raise officers' ability to prepare for war". He stipulated that they "rectify the style and practice, straighten up discipline and fight against corruption in both depth and width".
One after another, Xi has dismissed top government and military leaders in recent months. What their exact offences are is difficult to ascertain, since the CCP operates in a cocoon of paranoia.
The list includes General Li Yuchao, top commander of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF); his political commissar General Xu Zhongbo; Xia Qingyue and Rao Wenmin, both deputy ministers of the PLA's Equipment Development Department; former Foreign Minister Qin Gang; and Defense Minister General Li Shangfu. Interestingly, the latter once led the Equipment Development Department from 2017-22 too.
In all, around a dozen top people have been presumed arrested, plus at least ten top PLARF officers. What is embarrassing is that Xi personally handpicked these persons, so what does this say about his omniscience? Obviously, he is fallible. Furthermore, despite all their oaths of fealty, not all Xi's acolytes can be trusted, and the CCP is having difficulty attracting pure loyalty to its ideology.
The depth of schisms and corruption are extremely serious, given that the PLARF controls China's entire nuclear weapon arsenal and that the Equipment Development Department develops and procure missiles. Replacement PLARF leaders have been appointed by Xi, even though they have no missile experience. This smacks of desperation on Xi's part, where he is more concerned about cleansing corruption than improving military capability.
Simultaneously, PLARF personnel must be reeling from poor morale at such deep-seated graft, and those in the upper echelons will be resentful they were overlooked for top jobs and tarred with the same brush of suspicion.
Such episodes demonstrate that Xi cannot implicitly trust those at the top of his military, especially those in charge of his most important strategic weapons like nuclear-tipped and conventional ballistic missiles, as well as nuclear-powered submarines. How can he order the PLA into war if he does not trust the loyalty of his forces?
The situation has been muddied further by several Western reports that the PLA Navy (PLAN) lost a Type 093 nuclear-powered attack submarine with all hands on 21 August. It must be stressed that these reports of a sunken submarine in the Yellow Sea are unverified and based on skimpy evidence.
As expected, China has denied any accident, and Western reports have not been convincing in terms of supporting evidence. Returning to the apparent schisms between politicians and the military, Dr Willy Wo-Lap Lam, a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation think-tank in the USA, noted, "Chinese social media contains reports that a sizable number of generals in the Rocket Force and other military divisions are reluctant to follow Xi Jinping's repeated calls for 'war preparations' against Taiwan. The reason is simple: China's leadership cannot guarantee a triumph over Taiwan's fast-modernizing forces, due to the doubtful effectiveness of the PLA's top-tier arsenal."
Any PLA commander, no matter how dim-witted, would know that any Chinese attack on Taiwan would likely draw in the USA and, by extension, Japan. Furthermore, countries such as Australia and the Philippines would probably offer strong support to their American ally. Any rash military action by Xi would therefore embroil the PLA in a war that it could not be confident of winning.
The fact is that China has experienced deterioration in its security environment, largely due to its own actions. India's stiffened resolve along the mountainous border, and collective action by allies like Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the USA all give Beijing food for thought.
Furthermore, the US military and allies are rapidly adopting new equipment, tactics and strategies to contain China within the First Island Chain should a conflict ever break out.
Unfortunately, these double-edged circumstances could also spur Xi to act irrationally. Xi has tight control over every apparatus of power, his tenure will continue till at least 2032, and he harbours ambitions to be recorded in history books as China's greatest modern leader - where conquering Taiwan would be the ultimate feather in his cap.
Yet he is already 70 years old, and he perhaps feels that events and time are conspiring against him. Black swan events like COVID have underscored how circumstances can change rapidly, and he will not want regional military support for the USA to coalesce further. Perhaps Xi is feeling some pressure to subjugate Taiwan sooner rather than later.
Consider the domestic scene as well, where China's economy is in relative freefall and, after draconian lockdowns during the pandemic, the economy has failed to rebound.
Unemployment is rising, and foreign direct investment is fleeing. Due to stiffening headwinds, could Xi be spurred into making a rash decision to go to war against Taiwan?
Lam of The Jamestown Foundation pondered such a scenario, "Hostilities against Taiwan will plunge regional and global economies into crisis. Nevertheless, Xi could use such an action to harness the long-cultivated nationalism of the PRC's disgruntled public. He will be able to declare martial law, which will give an even freer hand to the supreme leader to lock up real and potential enemies. These would include increasingly large numbers of protesting, unemployed blue-collar workers, as well as unpaid civil servants, and bank customers unable to withdraw money from their deposits."
The Hong Kong professor continued to play the devil's advocate, "Equally important, a takeover of Taiwan would contribute to the attainment of the supreme leader's 'Chinese Dream', which consists of raising China's status as the final arbiter of a 'new world order'. This would put Xi's achievements at least on a par with those of his idol, Mao Zedong."
With Xi ensconced in an echo chamber, surrounded by sycophants unable or unwilling to give him wise counsel, it is difficult to predict what Xi might do. The same was true of Tsar Vladimir Putin when he invaded Ukraine. Who in their right mind could see logic in Putin's actions? That he went ahead, implacable in his deluded belief that Ukraine would fall before his onslaught, demonstrated that some despotic leaders live in fantasy bubbles. The same could equally be true of Xi.
For years, Xi has been telling audiences at home and abroad that "the East is rising and the West is declining", and that China is taking its rightful preeminent position on the world stage. He no doubt believes it. How he would love to prove himself right to his own populace, to autocratic states like Russia, and to the world at large. Even though China is happy to ride roughshod over others, there is still a sense that it wants international acclaim rather than opprobrium.
This is seen in rhetorical efforts to paint itself as neutral in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, even though Xi is steadfastly on Putin's side. China's authoritarian tendencies were also evident last month when Xi sent an aircraft to Damascus to pick up Syrian criminal mastermind Bashar al-Assad so he could attend the opening ceremony of the 19th Asian Games in Hangzhou.
Afterwards, Xi and Assad signed a treaty affirming a strategic partnership. Xi will soon celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative too, his brainchild. It will be a glitzy affair, but few Western leaders will attend since they have seen through Xi's lofty but hollow promises of a "universe of common destiny".
It will be tragic if he provokes his own country and that of others to much suffering if he attacks Taiwan. Lam concluded, "Uncertainty about what lies ahead could push Xi to launch an invasion for two reasons: first, he could be compelled by a sense that his window of opportunity will not be open for much longer; and second, uncertainty from the rest of the world is something that Xi might attempt to take advantage of."
However, it is the uncertainty at the top of the PLARF and Equipment Development Department that is currently most determinative, suggesting that such an event is at least not an imminent possibility.
"Should Xi eventually feel emboldened to take such a drastic step, even if the PLA's missiles were able to prove their worth in a relatively swift conquest of Taiwan, it could take several decades before Taiwanese will cower before the harsh dictatorship of the CCP regime. Without a victory over Taiwan, Xi's status as the 'Mao Zedong of the 21st century' in the CCP pantheon could be threatened. The likelihood would then increase that the party core responsible for the country's failure to improve the economy, expand its global clout and upgrade its military prowess could be driven from power sometime in the coming decade, though how that might unfold cannot be predicted at present. Much therefore hinges on Xi's choices, and his ability to execute them, in the next few years."
Speaking of trust, it is certainly not a quality that permeates the PLA. Those on the lower rungs of the slippery hierarchy cannot be confident in their leaders, for they might be incompetent and simply wormed their way into positions based on connections or bribes. Nor can those at the top relax - there are fears of graft investigations, and they are busy manoeuvring themselves to look good before superiors and ultimately before Xi.
The PLA is hamstrung by numerous hang-ups, not least of which is political correctness and loyalty to the CCP.
This lack of trust can be discerned in the PLAN submarine force. Even though missile-armed nuclear submarines are foraying farther afield, Xi does not entrust submarine commanders with significant autonomy. Indeed, the CCP cannot delegate, for its very existence depends on tightly centralized control that demands total fealty.
Thus, there is a standard unofficial practice of embarking additional party card-carrying commanders on every submarine mission, alongside the official submarine commander.
Although there was talk of reforming this clumsy practice of "nanny commanders", it seems to have persisted. These extra people might be called a "mission commander", "trainer captain", "headquarters guiding group" or "at-sea temporary party committee", but they merely dilute the autonomy of submarine commanders.
As an example, in around 2010, an East Sea Fleet flotilla mandated that a minimum of three senior officers be aboard every submarine so as to "strengthen leadership". The real purpose was for everyone to keep their eye on each other so they would toe the party line. Obviously, this kind of micromanagement undermines the autonomy and leadership of submarine commanders and stunts their leadership skills.
In 2018, the PLAN said it would prohibit such policies, but the practice has probably not disappeared.
In 2022, for instance, a deputy political commissar of a Southern Theater Navy submarine flotilla observed that, "Even if a submarine is under extreme conditions and it is difficult to report immediately, after the situation is handled, it must be reported in a timely manner ... to ensure that General Secretary Xi's decision-making and tasking are fully implemented while diving to the ocean's depths and at the furthest extremity of the grassroots without compromise."
In other words, the long arm of Xi extends even to the ocean depths; there is no escaping his roving eye, and trust in PLA commanders is lacking. This shows the dichotomy that China's strict communist regime has created for itself - it wants a capable military, but the party cannot trust its members to do the right thing!
In fact, this same problem assails Xi. He cannot fully trust his underlings, even those he appointed. These recent revelations of corruption and disloyalty amongst the nation's highest echelons are an embarrassment to Xi, so much so that no explanation has been forthcoming. This all runs counter to the notion that Xi is the master of the CCP.
At the same time, it is alarming, for it might goad Xi into doing something reckless before things worsen further.
✔️ Divisions at the top raise questions about Xi's confidence in the PLA
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